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Abstract
In its classical form, a consistent replicated service requires all replicas to witness the same
evolution of the service state. Assuming a message-passing environment with a majority of
correct processes, the necessary and sufficient information about failures for implementing a
general state machine replication scheme ensuring consistency is captured by the Ω failure
detector.
This paper shows that in such a message-passing environment, Ω is also the weakest failure
detector to implement an eventually consistent replicated service, where replicas are expected
to agree on the evolution of the service state only after some (a priori unknown) time.
In fact, we show that Ω is the weakest to implement eventual consistency in any message-
passing environment, i.e., under any assumption on when and where failures might occur. En-
suring (strong) consistency in any environment requires, in addition to Ω, the quorum failure
detector Σ. Our paper thus captures, for the first time, an exact computational difference be-
tween building a replicated state machine that ensures consistency and one that only ensures
eventual consistency.
1 Introduction
State machine replication [20, 25] is the most studied technique to build a highly-available and con-
sistent distributed service. Roughly speaking, the idea consists in replicating the service, modeled
as a state machine, over several processes and ensuring that all replicas behave like one correct and
available state machine, despite concurrent invocations of operations and failures of replicas. This
is typically captured using the abstraction of a total order broadcast [3], where messages represent
invocations of the service operations from clients to replicas (server processes). Assuming that the
state machine is deterministic, delivering the invocations in the same total order ensures indeed
that the replicas behave like a single state machine. Total order broadcast is, in turn, typically
implemented by having the processes agree on which batch of messages to execute next, using the
consensus abstraction [21, 3]. (The two abstractions, consensus and total order broadcast, were
shown to be equivalent [3].)
Replicas behaving like a single one is a property generally called consistency. The sole purpose
of the abstractions underlying the state machine replication scheme, namely consensus and total
order broadcast, is precisely to ensure this consistency, while providing at the same time availability,
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namely that the replicated service does not stop responding. The inherent costs of these abstractions
are sometimes considered too high, both in terms of the necessary computability assumptions about
the underlying system [11, 2, 1], and the number of communication steps needed to deliver an
invocation [21, 22].
An appealing approach to circumvent these costs is to trade consistency with what is sometimes
called eventual consistency [24, 28]: namely to give up the requirement that the replicas always
look the same, and replace it with the requirement that they only look the same eventually, i.e.,
after a finite but not a priori bounded period of time. Basically, eventual consistency says that the
replicas can diverge for some period, as long as this period is finite.
Many systems claim to implement general state machines that ensure eventual consistency in
message-passing systems, e.g., [19, 7]. But, to our knowledge, there has been no theoretical study
of the exact assumptions on the information about failures underlying those implementations. This
paper is the first to do so: using the formalism of failure detectors [3, 2], it addresses the question
of the minimal information about failures needed to implement an eventually consistent replicated
state machine.
It has been shown in [2] that, in a message-passing environment with a majority of correct
processes, the weakest failure detector to implement consensus (and, thus, total order broadcast [5])
is the eventual leader failure detector, denoted Ω. In short, Ω outputs, at every process, a leader
process so that, eventually, the same correct process is considered leader by all. Ω can thus be
viewed as the weakest failure detector to implement a generic replicated state machine ensuring
consistency and availability in an environment with a majority of correct processes.
We show in this paper that, maybe surprisingly, the weakest failure detector to implement an
eventually consistent replicated service in this environment (in fact, in any environment) is still Ω.
We prove our result via an interesting generalization of the celebrated “CHT proof” by Chandra,
Hadzilacos and Toueg [2]. In the CHT proof, every process periodically extracts the identifier of a
process that is expected to be correct (the leader) from the valencies of an ever-growing collection
of locally simulated runs. We carefully adjust the notion of valency to apply this approach to
the weaker abstraction of eventual consensus, which we show to be necessary and sufficient to
implement eventual consistency.
Our result becomes less surprising if we realize that a correct majority prevents the system
from being partitioned, and we know that both consistency and availability cannot be achieved
while tolerating partitions [1, 13, 8]. Therefore, in a system with a correct majority of processes,
there is no gain in weakening consistency: (strong) consistency requires the same information
about failures as eventual one. In an arbitrary environment, however, i.e., under any assumptions
on when and where failures may occur, the weakest failure detector for consistency is known to be
Ω + Σ, where Σ [8] returns a set of processes (called a quorum) so that every two such quorums
intersect at any time and there is a time after which all returned quorums contain only correct
processes. We show in this paper that ensuring eventual consistency does not require Σ: only Ω
is needed, even if we do not assume a majority of correct processes. Therefore, Σ represents the
exact difference between consistency and eventual consistency. Our result thus theoretically backs
up partition-tolerance [1, 13] as one of the main motivations behind the very notion of eventual
consistency.
We establish our results through the following steps:
• We give precise definitions of the notions of eventual consensus and eventual total order
broadcast. We show that the two abstractions are equivalent. These underlie the intuitive
notion of eventual consistency implemented in many replicated services [7, 6, 4].
• We show how to extend the celebrated CHT proof [2], initially establishing that Ω is necessary
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for solving consensus, to the context of eventual consensus. Through this extension, we
indirectly highlight a hidden power of the technique proposed in [2] that somehow provides
more than was used in the original CHT proof.
• We present an algorithm that uses Ω to implement, in any message-passing environment, an
eventually consistent replicated service. The algorithm features three interesting properties:
(1) An invocation can be performed after the optimal number of two communication steps,
even if a majority of processes is not correct and even during periods when processes disagree
on the leader, i.e., partition periods; 1 (2) If Ω outputs the same leader at all processes from
the very beginning, then the algorithm implements total order broadcast and hence ensures
consistency; (3) Causal ordering is ensured even during periods where Ω outputs different
leaders at different processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our system model and basic definitions
in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce abstractions for implementing eventual consistency: namely,
eventual consensus and eventual total order broadcast, and we prove them to be equivalent. We
show in Section 4 that the weakest failure detector for eventual consensus in any message-passing
environment is Ω. We present in Section 5 our algorithm that implements eventual total order
broadcast using Ω in any environment. Section 6 discusses related work, and Section 7 concludes
the paper. In the optional appendix, we present some proofs omitted from the main paper, discuss
an alternative (seemingly relaxed but equivalent) definition of eventual consensus, and recall basic
steps of the CHT proof.
2 Preliminaries
We adopt the classical model of distributed systems provided with the failure detector abstraction
proposed in [3, 2]. In particular we employ the simplified version of the model proposed in [14, 17].
We consider a message-passing system with a set of processes Π = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} (n ≥ 2).
Processes execute steps of computation asynchronously, i.e., there is no bound on the delay between
steps. However, we assume a discrete global clock to which the processes do not have access. The
range of this clock’s ticks is N. Each pair of processes are connected by a reliable link.
Processes may fail by crashing. A failure pattern is a function F : N → 2Π, where F (t) is the
set of processes that have crashed by time t. We assume that processes never recover from crashes,
i. e., F (t) ⊆ F (t+ 1). Let faulty(F ) = ⋃t∈N F (t) be the set of faulty processes in a failure pattern
F ; and correct(F ) = Π− faulty(F ) be the set of correct processes in F . An environment, denoted
E , is a set of failure patterns.
A failure detector history H with range R is a function H : Π × N → R, where H(p, t) is
interpreted as the value output by the failure detector module of process p at time t. A failure
detector D with range R is a function that maps every failure pattern F to a nonempty set of
failure detector histories. D(F ) denotes the set of all possible failure detector histories that may
be output by D in a failure pattern F .
For example, at each process, the leader failure detector Ω outputs the id of a process; further-
more, if a correct process exists, then there is a time after which Ω outputs the id of the same
correct process at every correct process. Another example is the quorum failure detector Σ, which
outputs a set of processes at each process. Any two sets output at any times and by any processes
intersect, and eventually every set output at any correct process consists of only correct processes.
1Note that three communication steps are, in the worst case, necessary when strong consistency is required [22].
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An algorithm A is modeled as a collection of n deterministic automata, where A(p) specifies the
behavior of process p. Computation proceeds in steps of these automata. In each step, identified as
a tuple (p,m, d,A), a process p atomically (1) receives a single message m (that can be the empty
message λ) or accepts an input (from the external world), (2) queries its local failure detector
module and receives a value d, (3) changes its state according to A(p), and (4) sends a message
specified by A(p) for the new state to every process or produces an output (to the external world).
Note that the use of λ ensures that a step of a process is always enabled, even if no message is sent
to it.
A configuration of an algorithm A specifies the local state of each process and the set of messages
in transit. In the initial configuration of A, no message is in transit and each process p is in the
initial state of the automaton A(p). A schedule S of A is a finite or infinite sequence of steps of A
that respects A(p) for each p.
Following [17], we model inputs and outputs of processes using input histories HI and output
histories HO that specify the inputs each process receives from its application and the outputs
each process returns to the application over time. A run of algorithm A using failure detector D in
environment E is a tuple R = (F,H,HI , HO, S, T ), where F is a failure pattern in E , H is a failure
detector history in D(F ), HI and HO are input and output histories of A, S is a schedule of A, and
T is a list of increasing times in N, where T [i] is the time when step S[i] is taken. H ∈ D(F ), the
failure detector values received by steps in S are consistent with H, and HI and HO are consistent
with S. An infinite run of A is admissible if (1) every correct process takes an infinite number of
steps in S; and (2) each message sent to a correct process is eventually received.
We then define a distributed-computing problem, such as consensus or total order broadcast, as
a set of tuples (HI , HO) where HI is an input history and HO is an output history. An algorithm A
using a failure detector D solves a problem P in an environment E if in every admissible run of A
in E , the input and output histories are in P . Typically, inputs and outputs represent invocations
and responses of operations exported by the implemented abstraction. If there is an algorithm that
solves P using D, we sometimes, with a slight language abuse, say that D implements P .
Consider two problems P and P ′. A transformation from P to P ′ in an environment E [16] is
a map TP→P ′ that, given any algorithm AP solving P in E , yields an algorithm AP ′ solving P ′ in
E . The transformation is asynchronous in the sense that AP is used as a “black box” where AP ′
is obtained by feeding inputs to AP and using the returned outputs to solve P ′. Hence, if P is
solvable in E using a failure detector D, the existence of a transformation TP→P ′ in E establishes
that P ′ is also solvable in E using D. If, additionally, there exists a transformation from P ′ to P
in E , we say that P and P ′ are equivalent in E .
Failure detectors can be partially ordered based on their “power”: failure detector D is weaker
than failure detector D′ in E if there is an algorithm that emulates the output of D using D′ in
E [2, 17]. If D is weaker than D′, any problem that can be solved with D can also be solved with
D′. For a problem P , D∗ is the weakest failure detector to solve P in E if (a) there is an algorithm
that uses D∗ to solve P in E , and (b) D∗ is weaker than any failure detector D that can be used to
solve P in E .
3 Abstractions for Eventual Consistency
We define two basic abstractions that capture the notion of eventual consistency: eventual total
order broadcast and eventual consensus. We show that the two abstractions are equivalent: each
of them can be used to implement the other.
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Eventual Total Order Broadcast (ETOB) The total order broadcast (TOB) abstraction [16]
exports one operation broadcastTOB(m) and maintains, at every process pi, an output variable di.
Let di(t) denote the value of di at time t. Intuitively, di(t) is the sequence of messages pi delivered
by time t. We write m ∈ di(t) if m appears in di(t).
A process pi broadcasts a message m at time t by a call to broadcastTOB(m). We say that a
process pi stably delivers a message m at time t if pi appends m to di(t) and m is never removed
from di after that, i.e., m /∈ di(t − 1) and ∀t′ ≥ t: m ∈ di(t′). Note that if a message is delivered
but not stably delivered by pi at time t, it appears in di(t) but not in di(t
′) for some t′ > t.
Assuming that broadcast messages are distinct, the TOB abstraction satisfies:
TOB-Validity If a correct process pi broadcasts a message m at time t, then pi eventually stably
delivers m, i.e., ∀t′′ ≥ t′ : m ∈ di(t′′) for some t′ > t.
TOB-No-creation If m ∈ di(t), then m was broadcast by some process pj at some time t′ < t.
TOB-No-duplication No message appears more than once in di(t).
TOB-Agreement If a message m is stably delivered by some correct process pi at time t, then m
is eventually stably delivered by every correct process pj .
TOB-Stability For any correct process pi, di(t1) is a prefix of di(t2) for all t1, t2 ∈ N, t1 ≤ t2.
TOB-Total-order Let pi and pj be any two correct processes such that two messages m1 and m2
appear in di(t) and dj(t) at time t. If m1 appears before m2 in di(t), then m1 appears before
m2 in dj(t).
We then introduce the eventual total order broadcast (ETOB) abstraction, which maintains the
same inputs and outputs as TOB (messages are broadcast by a call to broadcastETOB(m)) and
satisfies, in every admissible run, the TOB-Validity, TOB-No-creation, TOB-No-duplication, and
TOB-Agreement properties, plus the following relaxed properties for some τ ∈ N:
ETOB-Stability For any correct process pi, di(t1) is a prefix of di(t2) for all t1, t2 ∈ N, τ ≤ t1 ≤ t2.
ETOB-Total-order Let pi and pj be correct processes such that messages m1 and m2 appear in
di(t) and dj(t) for some t ≥ τ . If m1 appears before m2 in di(t), then m1 appears before m2
in dj(t).
As we show in this paper, satisfying the following optional (but useful) property in ETOB does not
require more information about failures.
TOB-Causal-Order Let pi be a correct process such that two messages m1 and m2 appear in
di(t) at time t ∈ N. If m2 depends causally of m1, then m1 appears before m2 in di(t).
Here we say that a message m2 causally depends on a message m1 in a run R, and write
m1 →R m2, if one of the following conditions holds in R: (1) a process pi sends m1 and then sends
m2, (2) a process pi receives m1 and then sends m2, or (3) there exists m3 such that m1 →R m3
and m3 →R m2.
Eventual Consensus (EC) The consensus abstraction (C) [11] exports, to every process pi, a
single operation proposeC that takes a binary argument and returns a binary response (we also say
decides) so that the following properties are satisfied:
C-Termination Every correct process eventually returns a response to proposeC.
C-Integrity Every process returns a response at most once.
5
C-Agreement No two processes return different values.
C-Validity Every value returned was previously proposed.
The eventual consensus (EC) abstraction exports, to every process pi, operations proposeEC1,
proposeEC2, . . . that take binary arguments and return binary responses. Assuming that, for all
j ∈ N, every process invokes proposeECj as soon as it returns a response to proposeECj−1, the
abstraction guarantees that, in every admissible run, there exists k ∈ N, such that the following
properties are satisfied:
EC-Termination Every correct process eventually returns a response to proposeECj for all j ∈ N.
EC-Integrity No process responds twice to proposeECj for all j ∈ N.
EC-Validity Every value returned to proposeECj was previously proposed to proposeECj for all
j ∈ N.
EC-Agreement No two processes return different values to proposeECj for all j ≥ k.
It is straightforward to transform the binary version of EC into a multivalued one with unbounded
set of inputs [23]. In the following, by referring to EC we mean a multivalued version of it.
Equivalence between EC and ETOB It is well known that, in their classical forms, the consensus
and the total order broadcast abstractions are equivalent [3]. In this section, we show that a similar
result holds for our eventual versions of these abstractions.
The intuition behind the transformation from EC to ETOB is the following. Each time a process
pi wants to ETOB-broadcast a message m, p sends m to each process. Periodically, every process
pi proposes its current sequence of messages received so far to EC. This sequence is built by
concatenating the last output of EC(stored in a local variable di) to the batch of all messages
received by the process and not yet present in di. The output of EC is stored in di, i.e., at any
time, each process delivers the last sequence of messages returned by EC.
The correctness of this transformation follows from the fact that ECeventually returns consis-
tent responses to the processes. Thus, eventually, all processes agree on the same linearly growing
sequence of stably delivered messages. Furthermore, every message broadcast by a correct process
eventually appears either in the delivered message sequence or in the batches of not yet delivered
messages at all correct processes. Thus, by EC-Validity of EC, every message ETOB-broadcast
by a correct process is eventually stored in di of every correct process pi forever. By construc-
tion, no message appears in di twice or if it was not previously ETOB-broadcast. Therefore, the
transformation satisfies the properties of ETOB.
The transformation from ETOB to EC is as follows. At each invocation of the EC primitive, the
process broadcasts a message using the ETOB abstraction. This message contains the proposed
value and the index of the consensus instance. As soon as a message corresponding to a given
eventual consensus instance is delivered by process pi (appears in di), pi returns the value contained
in the message.
Since the ETOB abstraction guarantees that every process eventually stably delivers the same se-
quence of messages, there exists a consensus instance after which the responses of the transformation
to all alive processes are identical. Moreover, by ETOB-Validity, every message ETOB-broadcast by
a correct process pi is eventually stably delivered. Thus, every correct process eventually returns
from any EC-instance it invokes. Thus, the transformation satisfies the EC specification.
Theorem 1. In any environment E, EC and ETOB are equivalent.
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From EC to ETOB To prove this result, it is sufficient to provide a protocol that implements
ETOB in an environment E knowing that there exists a protocol that implements EC in this en-
vironment. This transformation protocol TEC→ETOB is stated in Algorithm 1. Now, we are going
to prove that TEC→ETOB implements ETOB. Assume that there exists a message m broadcast by a
correct process pi at time t. As pi is correct, every correct process receives the message push(m) in
a finite time. Then, m appears in the set toDeliver of all correct processes in a finite time. Hence,
by the termination property of EC and the construction of the function NewBatch, there exists
` such that m is included in any sequence submitted to proposeEC`. By the EC-Validity and the
EC-Termination properties, we deduce that pi stably delivers m in a finite time, that proves that
TEC→ETOB satisfies the TOB-Validity property. If a process pi delivers a message m at time t, then
m appears in the sequence responded by its last invocation of proposeEC`. By construction and by
the EC-Validity property, this sequence contains only messages that appear in the set toDeliver of
a process pj at the time pj invokes proposeEC`. But this set is incrementally built at the reception
of messages push that contains only messages broadcast by a process. This implies that TEC→ETOB
satisfies the TOB-No-creation. As the sequence outputted at any time by any process is the re-
sponse to its last invocation of proposeEC and that the sequence submitted to any invocation of
this primitive contains no duplicated message (by definition of the function NewBatch), we can
deduce from the EC-Validity property that TEC→ETOB satisfies the TOB-No-duplication. Assume
that a correct process pi stably delivers a message m, i.e., there exists a time after which m always
appears in di. By the algorithm, m always appears in the response of proposeEC to pi after this
time. As EC-Agreement property is eventually satisfied, we can deduce that m always appears in
the response of proposeEC for any correct process after some time. Thus, any correct process stably
delivers m, and TEC→ETOB satisfies the TOB-Agreement. Let τ be the time after which the EC prim-
itive satisfies EC-Agreement and EC-Validity. Let pi be a correct process and τ ≤ t1 ≤ t2. Let `1
(respectively `2) be the integer such that di(t1) (respectively di(t2)) is the response of proposeEC`1
(respectively proposeEC`2). By construction of the protocol and the EC-Agreement and EC-Validity
properties, we know that, after time τ , the response of proposeEC` to correct processes is a prefix
of the response of proposeEC`+1. As we have `1 ≤ `2, we can deduce that TEC→ETOB satisfies the
ETOB-Stability property. Let pi and pj be two correct processes such that two messages m1 and
m2 appear in di(t) and dj(t) at time t ≥ τ . Let ` be the smallest integer such that m1 and m2
appear in the response of proposeEC`. By the EC-Agreement property, we know that the response
of proposeEC` is identical for all correct processes. Then , by the ETOB-Stability property proved
above, that implies that, if m1 appears before m2 in di(t), then m1 appears before m2 in dj(t). In
other words, TEC→ETOB satisfies the ETOB-Total-order property. In conclusion, TEC→ETOB satisfies
the ETOB specification in an environment E provided that there exists a protocol that implements
EC in this environment.
From ETOB to EC To prove this result, it is sufficient to provide a protocol that implements EC in
an environment E given a protocol that implements ETOB in this environment. This transformation
protocol TETOB→EC is stated in Algorithm 2. Now, we are going to prove that TETOB→EC implements
EC.
Let pi be a correct process that invokes proposeEC`(v) with ` ∈ N. Then, by fairness and the
TOB-Validity property, the construction of the protocol implies that the ETOB primitive delivers
the message (`, v) to pi in a finite time. By the use of the local timeout, we know that pi returns from
proposeEC`(v) in a finite time, that proves that TETOB→EC satisfies the EC-Termination property.
The update of the variable counti to ` for any process pi that invokes proposeEC` and the
assumptions on operations proposeEC ensure us that pi executes at most once the function
DecideEC(`, receivedi[Ωi, `]). Hence, TETOB→EC satisfies the EC-Integrity property.
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Algorithm 1 TEC→ETOB: transformation from EC to ETOB for process pi
Proof. Output variable:
di: sequence of messages of M (initially empty) outputted at any time by pi
Internal variables:
toDeliveri: set of messages of M (initially empty) containing all messages received by pi
counti: integer (initially 0) that stores the number of the last instance of consensus invoked by pi
Messages:
push(m) with m a message of M
Functions:
Send(message) sends message to all processes (including pi)
NewBatch(di, toDeliveri) returns a sequence containing all messages from the set toDeliveri\{m|m ∈
di}
On reception of broadcastETOB(m) from the application
Send(push(m))
On reception of push(m) from pj
toDeliveri := toDeliveri ∪ {m}
On reception of d as response of proposeEC`
di := d
counti := counti + 1
proposeECcounti(di.NewBatch(di, toDeliveri))
On local timeout
If counti = 0 then⌊
counti := 1
proposeEC1(NewBatch(di, toDeliveri))
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Let τ be the time after which the ETOB-Stability and the ETOB-Total-order properties are
satisfied. Let k be the smallest integer such that any process that invokes proposeECk in run r
invokes it after τ .
If we assume that there exist two correct processes pi and pj that return different values to
proposeEC` with ` ≥ k, we obtain a contradiction with the ETOB-Stability, ETOB-Total-order, or
TOB-Agreement property. Indeed, if pi returns a value after time τ , that implies that this value
appears in di and then, by the TOB-Agreement property, this value eventually appears in dj . If pj
returns a different value from pi, that implies that this value is the first occurrence of a message
associated to proposeEC` in dj at the time of the return of proposeEC`. After that, dj cannot satisfy
simultaneously the ETOB-Stability and the ETOB-Total-order properties. This contradiction shows
that TETOB→EC satisfies the EC-Agreement property.
If we assume that there exists a process pi that returns to proposeEC` with ` ∈ N a value that was
not proposed to proposeEC`, we obtain a contradiction with the TOB-No-creation property. Indeed,
the return of pi from proposeEC` is chosen in di that contains the output of the ETOB primitive
and processes broadcast only proposed values. This contradiction shows that TETOB→EC satisfies
the EC-Validity property.
In conclusion, TETOB→EC satisfies the EC specification in an environment E provided that there
exists a protocol that implements ETOB in this environment.
Algorithm 2 TETOB→EC: transformation from ETOB to EC for process pi
Internal variables:
counti: integer (initially 0) that stores the number of the last instances of consensus invoked by pi
di: sequence of messages (initially empty) outputted to pi by the ETOB primitive
Functions:
First(`): returns the value v such that (`, v) is the first message of the form (`, ∗) in di if such messages
exist, ⊥ otherwise
DecideEC(`, v): returns the value v as response to proposeEC`
On invocation of proposeEC`(v)
counti := `
broadcastETOB((`, v))
On local time out
If First(counti) 6= ⊥ then⌊
DecideEC(counti, F irst(counti))
4 The Weakest Failure Detector for EC
In this section, we show that Ω is necessary and sufficient for implementing the eventual consensus
abstraction EC:
Theorem 2. In any environment E, Ω is the weakest failure detector for EC.
Ω is necessary for EC Let E be any environment. We show below that Ω is weaker than any
failure detector D that can be used to solve EC in E . Recall that implementing Ω means outputting,
at every process, the identifier of a leader process so that eventually, the same correct leader is
output permanently at all correct processes.
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First, we briefly recall the arguments use by Chandra et al. [2] in the original CHT proof deriving
Ω from any algorithm solving consensus (to get a more detailed survey of the proof please rever to
Appendix B or [12, Chapter 3]). The basic observation there is that a run of any algorithm using
a failure detector induces a directed acyclic graph (DAG). The DAG contains a sample of failure
detector values output by D in the current run and captures causal relations between them. Each
process pi maintains a local copy of the DAG, denoted by Gi: pi periodically queries its failure
detector module, updates Gi by connecting every vertex of the DAG with the vertex containing
the returned failure-detector value with an edge, and broadcasts the DAG. An edge from vertex
[pi, d,m] to vertex [pj , d
′,m′] is thus interpreted as “pi queried D for the mth time and obtained
value d and after that pj queried D for the m′th time and obtained value d′”. Whenever pi receives
a DAG Gj calculated earlier by pj , pi merges Gi with Gj . As a result, DAGs maintained by the
correct processes converge to the same infinite DAG G. The DAG Gi is then used by pi to simulate
a number of runs of the given consensus algorithm A for all possible inputs to the processes. All
these runs are organized in the form of a simulation tree Υi. The simulation trees Υi maintained
by the correct processes converge to the same infinite simulation tree Υ.
The outputs produced in the simulated runs of Υi are then used by pi to compute the current
estimate of Ω. Every vertex σ of Υi is assigned a valency tag based on the decisions taken in all its
extensions (descendants of σ in Υi): σ is assigned a tag v ∈ {0, 1} if σ has an extension in which
some process decides v. A vertex is bivalent if it is assigned both 0 and 1. It is then shown in [2] that
by locating the same bivalent vertex in the limit tree Υ, the correct process can eventually extract
the identifier of the same correct process. (More details can be found in Appendix B and [2, 12].)
We show that this method, originally designed for consensus, can be extended to eventual
consensus (i.e., to the weaker EC abstraction). The extension is not trivial and requires carefully
adjusting the notion of valency of a vertex in the simulation tree.
Lemma 1. In every environment E, if a failure detector D implements EC in E, then Ω is weaker
than D in E.
Proof. Let A be any algorithm that implements EC using a failure detector D in an environment E .
As in [2], every process pi maintains a failure detector sample stored in DAG Gi and periodically
uses Gi to simulate a set of runs of A for all possible sequence of inputs of EC. The simulated runs
are organized by pi in an ever-growing simulation tree Υi. A vertex of Υi is the schedule of a finite
run of A “triggered” by a path in Gi in which every process starts with invoking proposeEC1(v),
for some v ∈ {0, 1}, takes steps using the failure detector values stipulated by the path in Gi and,
once proposeEC`(v) is complete, eventually invokes proposeEC`+1(v
′), for some v′ ∈ {0, 1}. (For the
record, we equip each vertex of Υi with the path in Gi used to produce it.) A vertex is connected
by an edge to each one-step extension of it. 2
Note that in every admissible infinite simulated run, EC-Termination, EC-Integrity and EC-
Validity are satisfied and that there is k > 0 such that for all ` ≥ k, the invocations and responses
of proposeEC` satisfy the EC-Agreement.
Since processes periodically broadcast their DAGs, the simulation tree Υi constructed locally by
a correct process pi converges to an infinite simulation tree Υ, in the sense that every finite subtree
of Υ is eventually part of Υi. The infinite simulation tree Υ, starting from the initial configuration
of A and, in the limit, contains all possible schedules that can triggered by the paths DAGs Gi.
2In [2], the simulated schedules form a simulation forest, where a distinct simulation tree corresponds to each
initial configuration encoding consensus inputs. Here we follow [17]: there is a single initial configuration and inputs
are encoded in the form of input histories. As a result, we get a single simulation tree where branches depend on the
parameters of proposeEC` calls.
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Algorithm 3 Locating a bivalent vertex in Υ.
k := 1
σ := root of Υ
while true do
if σ is k-bivalent then break
σ1 := a descendant of σ in which
EC-Agreement does not hold for proposeECk
σ2 := a descendant of σ1 in which every correct process
completes proposeECk and receives
all messages sent to it in σ
choose k′ > k and σ3, a descendant of σ2, such that
k′-tag of σ3 contains {0, 1}
k := k′
σ := σ3
Consider a vertex σ in Υ identifying a unique finite schedule of a run of A using D in the current
failure pattern F . For k > 0, we say that σ is k-enabled if k = 1 or σ contains a response from
proposeECk−1 at some process. Now we associate each vertex σ in Υ with a set of valency tags
associated with each “consensus instance” k, called the k-tag of σ, as follows:
• If σ is k-enabled and has a descendant (in Υ) in which proposeECk returns x ∈ {0, 1}, then
x is added to the k-tag of σ.
• If σ is k-enabled and has a descendant in which two different values are returned by
proposeECk, then ⊥ is added to the k-tag of σ.
If σ is not k-enabled, then its k-tag is empty. If the k-tag of σ is {x}, x ∈ {0, 1}, we say that
σ is (k, x)-valent (k-univalent). If the k-tag is {0, 1}, then we say that σ is k-bivalent. If the k-tag
of σ contains ⊥, we say that σ is k-invalid
Since A ensures EC-Termination in all admissible runs extending σ, each k-enabled vertex σ,
the k-tag of σ is non-empty. Moreover, EC-Termination and EC-Validity imply that a vertex in
which no process has invoked proposeECk yet has a descendant in which proposeECk returns 0 and
a descendant in which proposeECk returns 1. Indeed, a run in which only v, v ∈ {0, 1} is proposed
in instance k and every correct process takes enough steps must contain v as an output. Thus:
(*) For each vertex σ, there exists k ∈ N and σ′, a descendant of σ, such that k-tag of σ′ contains
{0, 1}.
If the “limit tree” Υ contains a k-bivalent vertex, we can apply the arguments of [2] to extract
Ω. Now we show that such a vertex exists in Υ. Then we can simply let every process locate the
“first” such vertex in its local tree Υi. To establish an order on the vertices, we can associate each
vertex σ of Υ with the value m such that vertex [pi, d,m] of G is used to simulate the last step of
σ (recall that we equip each vertex of Υ with the corresponding path). Then we order vertices of
Υ in the order consistent with the growth of m. Since every vertex in G has only finitely many
incoming edges, the sets of vertices having the same value of m are finite. Thus, we can break the
ties in the m-based order using any deterministic procedure on these finite sets.
Eventually, by choosing the first k-bivalent vertex in their local trees Υi, the correct processes
will eventually stabilize on the same k-bivalent vertex σ˜ in the limit tree Υ and apply the CHT
extraction procedure to derive the same correct process based on k-tags assigned to σ˜’s descendants.
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It remains to show that Υ indeed contains a k-bivalent vertex for some k. Consider the procedure
described in Algorithm 3 that intends to locate such a vertex, starting with the root of the tree.
For the currently considered k-enabled vertex σ that is not k-bivalent (if it is k-bivalent, we are
done), we use (*) to locate σ3, a descendant of σ, such that (1) in σ3, two processes return different
values in proposeECk in σ3, (2) in σ3, every correct process has completed proposeECk and has
received every message sent to it in σ, and (3) the k′-tag of σ3 contains {0, 1}.
Thus, the procedure in Algorithm 3 either terminates by locating a k-bivalent tag and then we
are done, or it never terminates. Suppose, by contradiction, that the procedure never terminates.
Hence, we have an infinite admissible run of A in which no agreement is provided in infinitely
many instances of consensus. Indeed, in the constructed path along the tree, every correct process
appears infinitely many times and receives every message sent to it. This admissible run violated
the EC-Agreement property of EC—a contradiction.
Thus, the correct processes will eventually locate the same k-bivalent vertex and then, as in [2],
stabilize extracting the same correct process identifier to emulate Ω.
Ω is sufficient for EC Chandra and Toueg proved that Ω is sufficient to implement the classical
version of the consensus abstraction in an environment where a majority of processes are correct
[3]. In this section, we extend this result to the eventual consensus abstraction for any environment.
The proposed implementation of EC is very simple. Each process has access to an Ω failure
detector module. Upon each invocation of the EC primitive, a process broadcasts the proposed value
(and the associated consensus index). Every process stores every received value. Each process pi
periodically checks whether it has received a value for the current consensus instance from the
process that it currently believes to be the leader. If so, pi returns this value. The correctness of
this EC implementation relies on the fact that, eventually, all correct processes trust the same leader
(by the definition of Ω) and then decide (return responses) consistently on the values proposed by
this process.
Lemma 2. In every environment E, EC can be implemented using Ω.
Proof. We propose such an implementation in Algorithm 4. Then, we prove that any admissible run
r of the algorithm in any environment E satisfies the EC-Termination, EC-Integrity, EC-Agreement,
and EC-Validity properties.
Assume that a correct process never returns from an invocation of proposeEC in r. Without
loss of generality, denote by ` the smallest integer such that a correct process pi never returns
from the invocation of proposeEC`. This implies that pi always evaluates receivedi[Ωi, counti] to
⊥. We know by definition of Ω that, eventually, Ωi always returns the same correct process pj .
Hence, by construction of `, pj returns from proposeEC0,..., proposeEC`−1 and then sends the
message promote(v, `) to all processes in a finite time. As pi and pj are correct, pi receives this
message and updates receivedi[Ωi, counti] to v in a finite time. Therefore, the algorithm satisfies
the EC-Termination property.
The update of the variable counti to ` for any process pi that invokes proposeEC` and the
assumptions on operations proposeEC ensure us that pi executes at most once the function
DecideEC(`, receivedi[Ωi, `]). Hence, the EC-Integrity property is satisfied.
Let τΩ be the time from which the local outputs of Ω are identical and constants for all correct
processes in r. Let k be the smallest integer such that any process that invokes proposeECk in r
invokes it after τΩ.
Let ` be an integer such that ` ≥ k. Assume that pi and pj are two processes that respond
to proposeEC`. Then, they respectively execute the function DecideEC(`, receivedi[Ωi, `]) and
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DecideEC(`, receivedj [Ωj , `]). By construction of k, we can deduce that Ωi = Ωj = pl. That
implies that pi and pj both received a message promote(v, `) from pl. As pl sends such a message
at most once, we can deduce that receivedi[pl, `] = receivedj [pl, `], that proves that ensures the
EC-Agreement property.
Let ` be an integer such that ` ≥ k. Assume that pi is a process that respond to proposeEC`.
The value returned by pi was previously received from Ωi in a message of type promote. By
construction of the protocol, Ωi sends only one message of this type and this latter contains the
value proposed to Ωi, hence, the EC-Validity property is satisfied.
Thus, Algorithm 4 indeed implements EC in any environment using Ω.
Algorithm 4 EC using Ω: algorithm for process pi
Local variables:
counti: integer (initially 0) that stores the number of the last instances of consensus invoked by pi
receivedi: two dimensional tabular that stores a value for each pair of processes/integer (initially ⊥)
Functions:
DecideEC(`, v) returns the value v as a response to proposeEC`
Messages:
promote(v, `) with v ∈ {0, 1} and ` ∈ N
On invocation of proposeEC`(v)
counti := `
Send promote(v, `) to all
On reception of promote(v, `) from pj
receivedi[j, `] := v
On local time out
If receivedi[Ωi, counti] 6= ⊥ do⌊
DecideEC(counti, receivedi[Ωi, counti])
5 An Eventual Total Order Broadcast Algorithm
We have shown in the previous section that Ω is the weakest failure detector for the EC abstraction
(and, by Theorem 1, the ETOB abstraction) in any environment. In this section, we describe an
algorithm that directly implements ETOB using Ω and which we believe is interesting in its own
right.
The algorithm has three interesting properties. First, it needs only two communication steps
to deliver any message when the leader does not change, whereas algorithms implementing clas-
sical TOB need at least three communication steps in this case. Second, the algorithm actually
implements total order broadcast if Ω outputs the same leader at all processes from the very be-
ginning. Third, the algorithm additionally ensures the property of TOB-Causal-Order, which does
not require more information about faults.
The intuition behind this algorithm is as follows. Every process that intends to ETOB-broadcast
a message sends it to all other processes. Each process pi has access to an Ω failure detector module
and maintains a DAG that stores the set of messages delivered so far together with their causal
dependencies. As long as pi considers itself the leader (its module of Ω outputs pi), it periodically
sends to all processes a sequence of messages computed from its DAG so that the sequence respects
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Algorithm 5 ET OB: protocol for process pi
Output variable:
di: sequence of messages m ∈M (initially empty) output by pi
Internal variables:
promotei: sequence of messages m ∈M (initially empty) promoted by pi when Ωi = pi
CGi: directed graph on messages of M (initially empty) that contains causality dependencies known by pi
Messages:
update(CGi) with CGi a directed graph on messages of M
promote(promotei) with promotei a sequence of messages m ∈M
Functions:
UpdateCG(m,C(m)) adds the node m and the set of edges {(m′,m)|m′ ∈ C(m)} to CGi
UnionCG(CGj) replaces CGi by the union of CGi and CGj
UpdatePromote() replaces promotei by one of the sequences of messages s such that promotei is a prefix of
s, s contains once all messages of CGi, and for every edge (m1,m2) of CGi, m1 appears before m2 in s
On broadcastETOB(m,C(m)) from the application
UpdateCG(m,C(m))
Send update(CGi) to all
On reception of update(CGj) from pj
UnionCG(CGj)
UpdatePromote()
On reception of promote(promotej) from pj
If Ωi = pj then⌊
di := promotej
On local time out
If Ωi = pi then⌊
Send promote(promotei) to all
the causal order and admits the last delivered sequence as a prefix. A process that receives a
sequence of messages delivers it only if it has been sent by the current leader output by Ω. The
correctness of this algorithm directly follows from the properties of Ω. Indeed, once all correct
processes trust the same leader, this leader promotes its own sequence of messages, which ensures
the ETOB specification.
The pseudocode of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 5). Below we present the proof of its
correctness, including the proof that the algorithm additionally ensures TOB-Causal-Order.
Lemma 3. In every environment E, Algorithm ET OB implements ETOB using Ω.
Proof. First, we prove that any run r of ET OB in any environment E satisfies the TOB-Validity,
TOB-No-creation, TOB-No-duplication, and TOB-Agreement properties.
Assume that a correct process pi broadcasts a message m at time t for a given t ∈ N. We
know that Ω outputs the same correct process pj to all correct processes in a finite time. As pj is
correct, it receives the message update(CGi) from pi (that contains m) in a finite time. Then, pj
includes m in its causality graph (by a call to UnionCG) and in its promotion sequence (by a call
to UpdatePromote). As pj never removes a message from its promotion sequence and is outputted
by Ω, pi adopts the promotion sequence of pj in a finite time and this sequence contains m, that
proves that ET OB satisfies the TOB-Validity property.
Any sequence outputted by any process is built by a call to UpdatePromote by a process pi.
This function ensures that any message appearing in the computed sequence appears in the graph
CGp. This graph is built by successive calls to UnionCG that ensure that the graph contains only
messages received in a message of type update. The construction of the protocol ensures us that
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such messages have been broadcast by a process. Then, we can deduce that ET OB satisfies the
TOB-No-creation property.
Any sequence outputted by any process is built by a call to UpdatePromote that ensures that
any message appears only once. Then, we can deduce that ET OB satisfies the TOB-No-duplication
property.
Assume that a correct process pi stably delivers a message m at time t for a given t ∈ N. We
know that Ω outputs the same correct process pj to all correct processes after some finite time. Since
m appears in every di(t
′) such that t′ ≥ t, we derive that m appears infinitely in promotej from a
given point of the run. Hence, the construction of the protocol and the correctness of pj implies
that any correct process eventually stably delivers m, and ET OB satisfies the TOB-Agreement
property.
We now prove that, for any environment E , for any run r of ET OB in E , there exists a τ ∈ N
satisfying ETOB-Stability, ETOB-Total-order, and TOB-Causal-Order properties in r. Hence, let r
be a run of ET OB in an environment E . Let us define:
• τΩ the time from which the local outputs of Ω are identical and constant for all correct
processes in r;
• ∆c the longest communication delay between two correct processes in r;
• ∆t the longest local timeout for correct processes in r;
• τ = τΩ + ∆t + ∆c
Let pi be a correct process and pj be the correct elected by Ω after τΩ. Let t1 and t2 be
two integers such that τ ≤ t1 ≤ t2. As the output of Ω is stable after τΩ and the choice of τ
ensures us that pi receives at least one message of type promote from pj , we can deduce from the
construction of the protocol that there exists t3 ≤ t1 and t4 ≤ t2 such that di(t1) = promotej(t3)
and di(t2) = promotej(t4). But the function UpdatePromote used to build promotej ensures that
promotej(t3) is a prefix of promotej(t4). Then, ET OB satisfies the ETOB-Stability property after
time τ .
Let pi and pj be two correct processes such that two messages m1 and m2 appear in di(t) and
dj(t) at time t ≥ τ . Assume that m1 appears before m2 in di(t). Let pk be the correct elected by Ω
after τΩ. As the output of Ω is stable after τΩ and the choice of τ ensures us that pi and pj receive
at least one message of type promote from pj , the construction of the protocol ensures us that we
can consider t1 and t2 such that di(t) = promotek(t1) and dj(t) = promotek(t2). The definition
of the function UpdatePromote executed by pk allows us to deduce that either di(t) is a prefix of
dj(t) or dj(t) is a prefix of di(t). In both cases, we obtain that m1 appears before m2 in dj(t), that
proves that ET OB satisfies the ETOB-Total-order property after time τ .
Let pi be a correct process such that two messages m1 and m2 appear in di(t) at time t ≥ 0.
Assume that m1 ∈ C(m2) when m2 is broadcast. Let pj be the process trusted by Ωi at the
time pi adopts the sequence di(t). If m2 appears in di(t), that implies that the edge (m1,m2)
appears in CGj at the time pj executes UpdatePromote (since pj previously executed UnionCG
that includes at least m and the set of edges {(m′,m)|m′ ∈ C(m)} in CGj). The construction of
UpdatePromote ensures us that m1 appears before m2 in di(t), that proves that ET OB satisfies
the TOB-Causal-Order property.
In conclusion, ET OB is an implementation of ETOB assuming that processes have access to the
Ω failure detector in any environment.
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6 Related Work
Modern data service providers such as Amazon’s Dynamo [7], Yahoo’s PNUTs [6] or Google Bigtable
distributed storage [4] are intended to offer highly available services. They consequently replicate
those services over several server processes. In order to tolerate process failures as well as partitions,
they consider eventual consistency [24, 28, 27].
The term eventual consensus was introduced in [18]. It refers to one instance of consensus which
stabilizes at the end; not multiple instances as we consider in this paper. In [9], a self-stabilizing
form of consensus was proposed: assuming a self-stabilizing implementation of S (also described in
the paper) and executing a sequence of consensus instances, validity and agreement are eventually
ensured. Their consensus abstraction is close to ours but the authors focused on the shared-memory
model and did not address the question of the weakest failure detector.
In [10], the intuition behind eventual consistency was captured through the concept of eventual
serializability. Two kinds of operations were defined: (1) a “stable” operation of which response
needs to be totally ordered after all operations preceding it and (2) “weak” operations of which
responses might not reflect all their preceding operations. Our ETOB abstraction captures consis-
tency with respect to the “weak” operations. (Our lower bound on the necessity of Ω naturally
extends to the stronger definitions.)
Our perspective on eventual consistency is closely related to the notion of eventual linearizability
discussed recently in [26] and [15]. It is shown in [26] that the weakest failure detector to boost
eventually linearizable objects to linearizable ones is ♦P . We are focusing primarily on the weakest
failure detector to implement eventual consistency, so their result is orthogonal to ours.
In [15], eventual linearizability is compared against linearizability in the context of implementing
specific objects in a shared-memory context. It turns out that an eventually linearizable imple-
mentation of a fetch-and-increment object is as hard to achieve as a linearizable one. Our ETOB
construction can be seen as an eventually linearizable universal construction: given any sequential
object type, ETOB provides an eventually linearizable concurrent implementation of it. Brought
to the message-passing environment with a correct majority, our results complement [15]: we show
that in this setting, an eventually consistent replicated service (eventually linearizable object with
a sequential specification) requires exactly the same information about failures as a consistent
(linearizable) one.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper defined the abstraction of eventual total order broadcast and proved its equivalence to
eventual consensus: two fundamental building blocks to implement a general replicated state ma-
chine that ensures eventual consistency. We proved that the weakest failure detector to implement
these abstractions is Ω, in any message-passing environment. We could hence determine the gap
between building a general replicated state machine that ensures consistency in a message-passing
system and one that ensures only eventual consistency. In terms of information about failures, this
gap is precisely captured by failure detector Σ [8]. In terms of time complexity, the gap is exactly
one message delay: an operation on the strongly consistent replicated must, in the worst case, incur
three communication steps [22], while one build using our eventually total order broadcast protocol
completes an operation in the optimal number of two communication steps.
Our ETOB abstraction captures a form of eventual consistency implemented in multiple repli-
cated services [7, 6, 4]. In addition to eventual consistency guarantees, such systems sometimes
produce indications when a prefix of operations on the replicated service is committed, i.e., is not
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subject to further changes. A prefix of operations can be committed, e.g., in sufficiently long pe-
riods of synchrony, when a majority of correct processes elect the same leader and all incoming
and outgoing messages of the leader to the correct majority are delivered within some fixed bound.
We believe that such indications could easily be implemented, during the stable periods, on top of
ETOB. Naturally, our results imply that Ω is necessary for such systems too.
Our EC abstraction assumes eventual agreement, but requires integrity and validity to be always
ensured. Other definitions of eventual consensus could be considered. In particular, we have studied
an eventual consensus abstraction assuming, instead of eventual agrement, eventual integrity, i.e.,
a bounded number of decisions in a given consensus instance could be revoked a finite number
of times. In Appendix A, we define this abstraction of eventual irrevocable consensus (EIC) more
precisely and show that it is equivalent to our EC abstraction.
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A Discussion on Eventual Consensus
Our definition of Eventual Consensus EC relaxes the Agreement property which holds after a finite
number of operations. We could instead relax the Integrity property where processes can change
their decisions a finite number of times. We discuss here the resulting abstraction.
A.1 Eventual Irrevocable Consensus (EIC)
The eventual irrevocable consensus (EIC) abstraction exports, to every process pi, operations
proposeEIC0, proposeEIC1, . . . that take binary arguments and return binary responses. If a pro-
cess pi responds more than once to proposeEIC` for some ` ∈ N, we consider that the response of
pi to proposeEIC` at time t ∈ N is its last response to proposeEIC` before t.
Assuming that every process receives proposeEIC` as soon as it returns a (first) response to
proposeEIC`−1 for all ` ∈ N, the abstraction guarantees, for every run, there exists k ∈ N such that
the following properties are satisfied:
EIC-Termination Every correct process eventually returns a response to proposeEIC` for all ` ∈ N.
EIC-Integrity No process responds twice to proposeEIC` for all ` ≥ k.
EIC-Agreement No two processes return infinitely different values to proposeEIC` for any ` ∈ N.
EIC-Validity Every value returned to proposeEICj was previously proposed to proposeEICj for all
j ∈ N.
Theorem 3. In every environment E, EC and EIC are equivalent.
A.2 Transformation from EC to EIC
Lemma 4. In every environment E, there exists a transformation from EC to EIC.
Proof. To prove this result, it is sufficient to provide a protocol that implements EIC in an en-
vironment E knowing that there exists a protocol that implements EC in this environment. This
transformation protocol TEC→EIC is stated in Algorithm 6. Now, we are going to prove that TEC→EIC
implements EIC.
As any invocation of proposeEIC` by a correct process pi leads to an invocation of ProposeEC`
by the same process, the EC-Termination property ensures us that pi receives eventually a response
(a sequence decison) from the EC primitive. Before this response, we have decisioni[`] = ⊥. By
the EC-Validity property, we know that decision[`] is a value proposed by one process (hence not
equal to ⊥). Then, the construction of the protocol ensures us that DecideEIC(`, decision[`]) is
executed in a finite time, that proves that TEC→EIC satisfies the EIC-Termination property.
Let k be the index after which the EC primitive satisfies EC-Agreement property. Let τ be the
smallest time where all correct processes receive the response of proposeECk.
After time τ , we know that the sequences decision returned to all process are identical. Then,
the construction of the protocol ensures us that every sequence submitted to the EC primitive is
prefixed by the last sequence returned by this primitive. Hence, the EC-Agreement property ensures
us that, after time τ , DecideEIC is executed only for the last value of the decision sequence and
only when this sequence grows, that proves that TEC→EIC satisfies the EIC-Integrity property.
Assume that two processes pi and pj return forever two different values for proposeEIC` for
some `. By the EIC-Integrity property proved above, we know that pi and pj take at most one
decision for proposeEIC` after time τ . That implies that pi and pj return different values at their
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last decision. Then, we can deduce that decisioni[`] 6= decisionj [`] forever, that is contradictory
with the definition of τ or with the EC-Agreement property. This contradiction shows us that
TEC→EIC satisfies the EIC-Agreement property.
The fact that TEC→EIC satisfies the EIC-Validity directly follows from the EC-Validity.
In conclusion, TEC→EIC satisfies the EIC specification in an environment E provided that there
exists a protocol that implements EC in this environment.
Algorithm 6 TEC→EIC: transformation from EC to EIC for process pi
Internal variables:
decisioni: sequence of values decided by pi (initially )
Functions:
DecideEIC(`, v) returns the value v as a response to proposeEIC`
On invocation of proposeEIC`(v)
proposeEC`(decisioni.v)
On reception of decision as response of proposeEC`
For k from 0 to ` do⌊
If decision[k] 6= decisioni[k] then⌊
DecideEIC(k, decision[k])
decisioni := decision
A.3 Transformation from EIC to EC
Lemma 5. In every environment E, there exists a transformation from EIC to EC.
Proof. To prove this result, it is sufficient to provide a protocol that implements EC in an envi-
ronment E knowing that there exists a protocol that implements EIC in this environment. This
transformation protocol TEIC→EC is stated in Algorithm 7. Now, we are going to prove that TEIC→EC
implements EC.
As any invocation of proposeEC` by a correct process pi leads to an invocation of proposeEIC`
by the same process, the EIC-Termination property ensures us that pi receives eventually at least
one response from the EIC primitive. The use of the counter counti allows us to deduce that only
the first response from the EIC primitive leads to a decision for proposeEC` by pi, that proves that
TEIC→EC satisfies the EC-Termination and the EC-Integrity properties.
The construction of the protocol and the EIC-Agreement and the EIC-Validity properties trivially
imply that TEIC→EC satisfies the EC-Agreement and the EC-Validity properties.
In conclusion, TEIC→EC satisfies the EC specification in an environment E provided that there
exists a protocol that implements EIC in this environment.
B Background on the CHT proof
Let E be any environment, D be any failure detector that can be used to solve consensus in E , and
A be any algorithm that solves consensus in E using D. We determine a reduction algorithm TD→Ω
that, using failure detector D and algorithm A, implements Ω in E . Recall that implementing Ω
means outputting, at every process, the id of a process so that eventually, the id of the same correct
process is output permanently at all correct processes.
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Algorithm 7 TEIC→EC: transformation from EIC to EC for process pi
Internal variables:
counti: integer (initially 0) that stores the number of the last instance of consensus invoked by pi
Functions:
DecideEC(`, v) returns the value v as a response to proposeEC`
On invocation of proposeEC`(v)
counti := `
proposeEIC`(v)
On reception of v as response of proposeEIC`
If counti = ` then⌊
DecideEC(`, v)
B.1 Overview of the reduction algorithm
The basic idea underlying TD→Ω is to have each process locally simulate the overall distributed
system in which the processes execute several runs of A that could have happened in the current
failure pattern and failure detector history. Every process then uses these runs to extract Ω.
In the local simulations, every process p feeds algorithm A with a set of proposed values, one
for each process of the system. Then all automata composing A are triggered locally by p which
emulates, for every simulated run of A, the states of all processes as well as the emulated buffer of
exchanged messages.
Crucial elements that are needed for the simulation are (1) the values from failure detectors
that would be output by D as well as (2) the order according to which the processes are taking
steps. For these elements, which we call the stimuli of algorithm A, process p periodically queries
its failure detector module and exchanges the failure detector information with the other processes.
The reduction algorithm TD→Ω consists of two tasks that are run in parallel at every process:
the commmuncation task and the computation task. In the communication task, every process
maintains ever-growing stimuli of algorithm A by periodically querying its failure detector module
and sending the output to all other processes. In the computation task, every process periodically
feeds the stimuli to algorithm A, simulates several runs of A, and computes the current emulated
output of Ω.
B.2 Building a DAG
The communication task of algorithm TD→Ω is presented in Figure 1. Executing this task, p knows
more and more of the processes’ failure detector outputs and temporal relations between them. All
this information is pieced together in a single data structure, a directed acyclic graph (DAG) Gp.
Informally, every vertex [q, d, k] of Gp is a failure detector value “seen” by q in its k-th query of its
failure detector module. An edge ([q, d, k], [q′, d′, k′]) can be interpreted as “q saw failure detector
value d (in its k-th query) before q′ saw failure detector value d′ (in its k′-th query)”.
DAG Gp has some special properties which follow from its construction. Let F be the current
failure pattern in E and H be the current failure detector history in D(F ). Then:
(1) The vertices of Gp are of the form [q, d, k] where q ∈ Π, d ∈ RD and k ∈ N. There is a
mapping τ : vertices of Gp 7→ T, associating a time with every vertex of Gp, such that:
(a) For any vertex v = [q, d, k], q /∈ F (τ(v)) and d = H(q, τ(v)). That is, d is the value
output by q’s failure detector module at time τ(v).
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Gp ← empty graph
kp ← 0
while true do
receive message m
dp ← query failure detector D
kp ← kp + 1
if m is of the form (q,Gq, p) then Gp ← Gp ∪Gq
add [p, dp, kp] and edges from all vertices of Gp to [p, dp, kp] to Gp
send (p,Gp, q) to all q ∈ Π
Figure 1: Building a DAG: process p
(b) For any edge (v, v′) in Gp, τ(v) < τ(v′). That is, any edge in Gp reflects the temporal
order in which the failure detector values are output.
(2) If v′ = [q, d, k] and v′′ = [q, d′, k′] are vertices of Gp, and k < k′, then (v, v′) is an edge of Gp.
(3) Gp is transitively closed: if (v, v
′) and (v′, v′′) are edges of Gp, then (v, v′′) is also an edge of
Gp.
(4) For all correct processes p and q and all times t, there is a time t′ ≥ t, a d ∈ RD and a k ∈ N
such that for every vertex v of Gp(t), (v, [q, d, k]) is an edge of Gp(t
′).3
Note that properties (1)–(4) imply that, for every correct process p, t ∈ T and k ∈ N, there is
a time t′ such that Gp(t′) contains a path g = [q1, d1, k1] → [q2, d2, k2] → . . ., such that (a) every
correct process appears at least k times in g, and (b) for any path g′ in Gp(t), g′ · g is also a path
in Gp(t
′).
B.3 Simulation trees
Now DAG Gp can be used to simulate runs of A. Any path g = [q1, d1, k1], [q2, d2, k2], . . . , [qs, ds, ks]
through Gp gives the order in which processes q1, q2, . . . , qs “see”, respectively, failure detector
values d1, d1, d2, . . . , ds. That is, g contains an activation schedule and failure detector outputs for
the processes to execute steps of A’s instances. Let I be any initial configuration of A. Consider
a schedule S that is applicable to I and compatible with g, i.e., |S| = s and ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s},
S[k] = (qk,mk, dk), where mk is a message addressed to qk (or the null message λ).
All schedules that are applicable to I and compatible with paths in Gp can be represented as a
tree ΥIp, called the simulation tree induced by Gp and I. The set of vertices of Υ
I
p is the set of all
schedules S that are applicable to I and compatible with paths in Gp. The root of Υ
I
p is the empty
schedule S⊥. There is an edge from S to S′ if and only if S′ = S · e for a step e; the edge is labeled
e. Thus, every vertex S of ΥIp is associated with a sequence of steps e1 e2 . . . es consisting of labels
of the edges on the path from S⊥ to S. In addition, every descendant of S in ΥIp corresponds to
an extension of e1 e2 . . . es.
The construction of ΥIp implies that, for any vertex S of Υ
I
p, there exists a partial run
〈F,H, I, S, T 〉 of A where F is the current failure pattern and H ∈ D(F ) is the current failure
detector history. Thus, if in S, correct processes appear sufficiently often and receive sufficiently
many messages sent to them, then every correct (in F ) process decides in S(I).
3 For any variable x and time t, x(t) denotes the value of x at time t.
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[p2, d2, k2]
[p1, d3, k3]
[p1, d1, k1]
(p1, λ, d1)
(p1,m
′
3, d3)
S⊥
(a) (b)
(p2, λ, d2)
(p1, λ, d3)
(p2,m2, d2)
(p1,m3, d3)
Figure 2: A DAG and a tree
In the example depicted in Figure 2, a DAG (a) induces a simulation tree a portion of which is
shown in (b). There are three non-trivial paths in the DAG: [p1, d1, k1]→ [p2, d2, k2]→ [p1, d3, k3],
[p2, d2, k2]→ [p1, d3, k3], [p2, d2, k2]→ [p1, d3, k3] and [p1, d1, k1]→ [p1, d3, k3]. Every path through
the DAG and an initial configuration I induce at least one schedule in the simulation tree.
Hence, the simulation tree has at least three leaves: (p1, λ, d1) (p2,m2, d2) (p1,m3, d3), (p2, λ, d2)
(p1,m
′
3, d3), and (p1, λ, d3). Recall that λ is the empty message: since the message buffer is empty
in I, no non-empty message can be received in the first step of any schedule.
B.4 Tags and valences
Let Ii, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} denote the initial configuration of A in which processes p1, . . . , pi propose 1
and the rest (processes pi+1, . . . , pn) propose 0. In the computation task of the reduction algorithm,
every process p maintains an ever-growing simulation forest Υp = {Υ0p,Υ1p, . . . ,Υnp} where Υip
(0 ≤ i ≤ n) denotes the simulation trees induced by Gp and initial configurations Ii.
For every vertex of the simulation forest, p assigns a set of tags. Vertex S of tree Υip is assigned
a tag v if and only if S has a descendant S′ in Υip such that p decides v in S′(Ii). We call the set
tags the valence of the vertex. By definition, if S has a descendant with a tag v, then S has tag v.
Validity of consensus ensures that the set of tags is a subset of {0, 1}.
Of course, at a given time, some vertices of the simulation forest Υp might not have any tags
because the simulation stimuli are not sufficiently long yet. But this is just a matter of time: if
p is correct, then every vertex of p’s simulation forest will eventually have an extension in which
correct processes appear sufficiently often for p to take a decision.
A vertex S of Υip is 0-valent if it has exactly one tag {0} (only 0 can be decided in S’s extensions
in Υip). A 1-valent vertex is analogously defined. If a vertex S has both tags 0 and 1 (both 0 and
1 can be decided in S’s extensions), then we say that S is bivalent.4
It immediately follows from Validity of consensus that the root of Υ0p can at most be 0-valent,
and the root of Υnp can at most be 1-valent (the roots of Υ
0
p and Υ
n
p cannot be bivalent).
4 The notion of valence was first defined in [11] as the set of values than are decided in all extensions of a given
execution. Here we define the valence as only a subset of these values, defined by the simulation tree.
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B.5 Stabilization
Note that the simulation trees can only grow with time. As a result, once a vertex of the simulation
forest Υp gets a tag v, it cannot lose it later. Thus, eventually every vertex of Υp stabilizes
being 0-valent, 1-valent, or bivalent. Since correct processes keep continuously exchanging the
failure detector samples and updating their simulation forests, every simulation tree computed by
a correct process at any given time will eventually be a subtree of the simulation forest of every
correct process.
Formally, let p be any correct process, t be any time, i be any index in {0, 1, . . . , n}, and S be
any vertex of Υip(t). Then:
(i) There exists a non-empty V ⊆ {0, 1} such that there is a time after which the valence of S is
V . (We say that the valence of S stabilizes on V at p.)
(ii) If the valence of S stabilizes on V at p, then for every correct process q, there is a time after
which S is a vertex of Υiq and the valence of S stabilizes on V at q.
Hence, the correct processes eventually agree on the same tagged simulation subtrees. In
discussing the stabilized tagged simulation forest, it is thus convenient to consider the limit in-
finite DAG G and the limit infinite simulation forest Υ = {Υ0,Υ1, . . . ,Υn} such that for all
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and all correct processes p, ∪t∈TGp(t) = G and ∪t∈TΥip(t) = Υi.
B.6 Critical index
Let p be any correct process. We say that index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is critical if either the root of Υi
is bivalent or the root of Υi−1 is 0-valent and the root of Υi is 1-valent. In the first case, we say
that i is bivalent critical. In the second case, we say that i is univalent critical.
Lemma 6. There is at least one critical index in {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Proof. Indeed, by the Validity property of consensus, the root of Υ0 is 0-valent, and the root of Υ1
is 1-valent. Thus, there must be an index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that the root of Υi−1 is 0-valent,
and Υi is either 1-valent or bivalent.
Since tagged simulation forests computed at the correct processes tend to the same infinite tagged
simulation forest, eventually, all correct processes compute the same smallest critical index i of
the same type (univalent or bivalent). Now we have two cases to consider for the smallest critical
index: (1) i is univalent critical, or (2) i is bivalent critical.
(1) Handling univalent critical index
Lemma 7. If i is univalent critical, then pi is correct.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that pi is faulty. Then G contains an infinite path g in which
pi does not participate and every correct process participates infinitely often. Then Υ
i contains a
vertex S such that pi does not take steps in S and some correct process p decides in S(I
i). Since i
is 1-valent, p decides 1 in S(Ii). But pi is the only process that has different states in I
i−1 and Ii,
and pi does not take part in S. Thus, S is also a vertex of Υ
i−1 and p decides 1 in S(Ii−1). But
the root of Υi−1 is 0-valent — a contradiction.
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(2) Handling bivalent critical index
Assume now that the root of Υi is bivalent. Below we show that Υi then contains a decision gadget,
i.e., a finite subtree which is either a fork or a hook (Figure 3).
S0
(0-valent)
S (bivalent)
(q,m, d)
S⊥
S0
(0-valent)
S1
(1-valent)
S (bivalent)
(q,m, d′)
S⊥
S1
(1-valent)
(q′,m′, d′)
(a) (b)
S′
(q,m, d) (q′,m′, d′)
Figure 3: A fork and a hook
A fork (case (a) in Figure 3) consists of a bivalent vertex S from which two different steps by
the same process q, consuming the same message m, are possible which lead, on the one hand, to
a 0-valent vertex S0 and, on the other hand, to a 1-valent vertex S1.
A hook (case (b) in Figure 3) consists of a bivalent vertex S, a vertex S′ which is reached by
executing a step of some process q, and two vertices S0 and S1 reached by applying the same step
of process q′ to, respectively, S and S′. Additionally, S0 must be 0-valent and S1 must be 1-valent
(or vice versa; the order does not matter here).
In both cases, we say that q is the deciding process, and S is the pivot of the decision gadget.
Lemma 8. The deciding process of a decision gadget is correct.
Proof. Consider any decision gadget γ defined by a pivot S, vertices S0 and S1 of opposite valence
and a deciding process q. By contradiction, assume that q is faulty. Let g, g0 and g1 be the
simulation stimuli of, respectively, S, S0 and S1. Then G contains an infinite path g˜ such that
(a) g · g˜, g0 · g˜, g1 · g˜ are paths in G, and (b) q does not appear and the correct processes appear
infinitely often in g.
Let γ be a fork (case (a) in Figure 3). Then there is a finite schedule S˜ compatible with a
prefix of g˜ and applicable to S(Ii) such that some correct process p decides in S · S˜(Ii); without
loss of generality, assume that p decides 0. Since q is the only process that can distinguish S(Ii)
and S1(I
i), and q does not appear in S˜, S˜ is also applicable to S1(I
i). Since g1 · g˜ is a path of G
and S˜ is compatible with a prefix of g˜, it follows that S1 · S˜ is a vertex of Υi. Hence, p also decides
0 in S1 · S˜(Ii). But S1 is 1-valent — a contradiction.
Let γ be a hook (case (b) in Figure 3). Then there is a finite schedule S˜ compatible with a
prefix of g and applicable to S0(I
i) such that some correct process p decides in S0 · S˜(Ii). Without
loss of generality, assume that S0 is 0-valent, and hence p decides 0 in S0 · S˜(Ii). Since q is the only
process that can distinguish S0(I
i) and S1(I
i), and q does not appear in S˜, S˜ is also applicable to
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S1(I
i). Since g1 · g˜ is a path of G and S˜ is compatible with a prefix of g˜, it follows that S1 · S˜ is a
vertex of Υi. Hence, p also decides 0 in S1 · S˜(Ii) But S1 is 1-valent — a contradiction.
Now we need to show that any bivalent simulation tree Υi contains at least one decision gadget γ.
Lemma 9. If i is bivalent critical, then Υi contains a decision gadget.
Proof. Let i be a bivalent critical index. In Figure 4, we present a procedure which goes through
Υi. The algorithm starts from the bivalent root of Υi and terminates when a hook or a fork has
been found.
S ← S⊥
while true do
p← 〈choose the next correct process in a round robin fashion〉
m← 〈choose the oldest undelivered message addressed to p in S(Ii)〉
if 〈S has a descendant S′ in Υi (possibly S = S′) such that, for some d,
S′ · (p,m, d) is a bivalent vertex of Υi〉
then S ← S′ · (p,m, d)
else exit
Figure 4: Locating a decision gadget
We show that the algorithm indeed terminates. Suppose not. Then the algorithm locates an
infinite fair path through the simulation tree, i.e., a path in which all correct processes get scheduled
infinitely often and every message sent to a correct process is eventually consumed. Additionally,
this fair path goes through bivalent states only. But no correct process can decide in a bivalent
state S(Ii) (otherwise we would violate the Agreement property of consensus). As a result, we
constructed a run of A in which no correct process ever decides — a contradiction.
Thus, the algorithm in Figure 4 terminates. That is, there exist a bivalent vertex S, a correct
process p, and a message m addressed to p in S(Ii) such that
(*) For all descendants S′ of S (including S′ = S) and all d, S′ · (p,m, d) is not a bivalent vertex
of Υi.
In other words, any step of p consuming message m brings any descendant of S (including S
itself) to either a 1-valent or a 0-valent state. Without loss of generality, assume that, for some d,
S · (p,m, d) is a 0-valent vertex of Υi. Since S is bivalent, it must have a 1-valent descendant S′′.
If S′′ includes a step in which p consumes m, then we define S′ as the vertex of Υi such that,
for some d′, S′ · (p,m, d′) is a prefix of S′′. If S′′ includes no step in which p consumes m, then we
define S′ = S′′. Since p is correct, for some d′, S′ · (p,m, d′) is a vertex of Υi. In both cases, we
obtain S′ such that for some d′, S′ · (p,m, d′) is a 1-valent vertex of Υi.
Let the path from S to S′ go through the vertices σ0 = S, σ1, . . . , σm−1, σm = S′. By transitivity
of G, for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}, σk · (p,m, d′) is a vertex of Υi. By (*), σk · (p,m, d′) is either 0-valent
or 1-valent vertex of Υi.
Let k ∈ {0, . . . ,m} be the lowest index such that (p,m, d′) brings σk to a 1-valent state. We
know that such an index exists, since σm · (p,m, d′) is 1-valent and all such resulting states are
either 0-valent or 1-valent.
Now we have the following two cases to consider: (1) k = 0, and (2) k > 0.
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σ0 = S (bivalent)
Case 1
(0-valent)
(p,m, d)
(0-valent)
(1-valent)
σm = S
′
(1-valent)
Case 2
(p′′,m′′, d′′)
σk−1
σk
(p,m, d′)
(p,m, d′)
(p,m, d′)
(p,m, d′)
S⊥
Figure 5: Locating a fork (Case 1) or a hook (Case 2)
Assume that k = 0, i.e., (p,m, d′) applied to S brings it to a 1-valent state. But we know that
there is a step (p,m, d) that brings S to a 0-valent state (Case 1 in Figure 5). That is, a fork is
located!
If k > 0, we have the following situation. Step (p,m, d′) brings σk−1 to a 0-valent state, and
σk = σk−1 · (p′,m′, d′′) to a 1-valent state (Case 2 in Figure 5). But that is a hook!
As a result, any bivalent infinite simulation tree has at least one decision gadget.
B.7 The reduction algorithm
Now we are ready to complete the description of TD→Ω. In the computation task (Figure 6), every
process p periodically extracts the current leader from its simulation forest, so that eventually
the correct processes agree on the same correct leader. The current leader is stored in variable
Ω-outputp.
Initially, p elects itself as a leader. Periodically, p updates its simulation forest Υp by incorpo-
rating more simulation stimuli from Gp. If the forest has a univalent critical index i, then p outputs
pi as the current leader estimate. If the forest has a bivalent critical index i and Υ
i
p contains a
decision gadget, then p outputs the deciding process of the smallest decision gadget in Υip (the
“smallest” can be well-defined, since the vertices of the simulation tree are countable).
Eventually, the correct processes locate the same stable critical index i. Now we have two cases
to consider:
(i) i is univalent critical. By Lemma 7, pi is correct.
(ii) i is bivalent critical. By Lemma 9, the limit simulation tree Υi contains a decision gadget.
Eventually, the correct processes locate the same decision gadget γ in Υi and compute the
deciding process q of γ. By Lemma 8, q is correct.
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Initially:
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n: Υip ← empty graph
Ω-outputp ← p
while true do
{ Build and tag the simulation forest induced by Gp }
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n do
Υip ← simulation tree induced by Gp and Ii
for every vertex S of Υip:
if S has a descendant S′ such that p decides v in S′(Ii) then
add tag v to S
{ Select a process from the tagged simulation forest }
if there is a critical index then
i← the smallest critical index
if i is univalent critical then Ω-outputp ← pi
if Υip has a decision gadget then
Ω-outputp ← the deciding process of the smallest decision gadget in Υip
Figure 6: Extracting a correct leader: code for each process p
Thus, eventually, the correct processes elect the same correct leader — Ω is emulated!
29
